This study finds that North Korea's nuclear test and the imposition of UN Security Council sanctions have had no perceptible effect on North Korea's trade with its two largest partners, China and South Korea. Before North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test, it was widely believed that such an event would have cataclysmic diplomatic ramifications. However, beginning with visual inspection of data and ending with time-series models, no evidence is found to support the notion that these events have had any effect on North Korea's trade with its two principal partners.
INTRODUCTION
Before the July missile firings, China publicly and privately warned North Korea not to proceed.
When the North Koreans went ahead, China (and Russia) supported the adoption of UN sanctions (Resolution 1695-targeted sanctions on missile proliferators). Although China blocked more sweeping proposals from the United States and Japan, one observer characterized the erosion in North Korea's diplomatic support as a "momentous move" (Hayes 2006) . The sanctions were the strongest reprimand of North Korea by the Security Council since 1950, and clearly represented an escalating response on the part of the United Nations.
When in October 2006
North Korea announced its intention to test a nuclear device, the UNSC issued a vague warning, which could have been interpreted as alluding to the prospect of tightened sanctions (Choi and Lee 2007) . One prominent observer predicted that such a test could lead to military action by the United States and possibly South Korea as well. 2 As it had in the case of the July 2006 missile tests, China cautioned North Korea not to proceed, warning of "grave consequences" if it did so.
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When North Korea once again defied Chinese wishes, Beijing described the act as "flagrant and brazen" and supported more robust sanctions-though as in the case of the July missile tests, with a less severe package than that proposed by the United States and Japan. Resolution 1718 was passed relatively quickly in six days. The resolution imposed an embargo on exports of heavy weapons, dual-use items, and luxury goods to North Korea, as well as the importation of heavy weapons systems from North Korea.
The administration of the sanctions was left up to the individual sanctioning countries. Russia, for example, defined "luxury goods" so narrowly (fur coats costing more than $9,637, watches costing nearly $2,000) that the sanctions' bite was questionable (Choi and Lee 2007) . Due to Chinese opposition, Article 42 of Chapter VII, which allows the use of military enforcement action, was not included despite US and Japanese support, and Chinese UN Ambassador Wang Guangya expressed hesitation about full implementation (Choi and Lee 2007, International Crisis Group 2006) . South Korea announced that in addition to the sanctions it would suspend food and fertilizer aid, though it would continue with other economic cooperation projects. North Korean UN Ambassador Park Gil-yon called the resolution "gangster-like" and the Foreign Ministry released a statement reiterating that sanctions were an act of war and threatening "a merciless strike" against any implementer of the UN resolution. 4 The chair of the UN sanctions committee, Italian Ambassador Marcello Spatafora, subsequently advised that 71 countries and the European Union had submitted reports on their implementation activities (UNSC 2007). China's report was notable in its lack of detail, however, and some countries such as Iran and Ethiopia, with past histories of North Korean weapon systems procurement, did not submit reports.
In sum, in the face of repeated North Korean provocations and despite the apparent reluctance of some countries, the United Nations had adopted increasingly stringent sanctions-and the stage had been set for bolder future action. The widely respected International Crisis Group (2006) opined: "Should the North test again, the Security Council would likely pass a new resolution with more sweeping sanctions and perhaps language authorizing enforcement by military means." The implication is that the activities of traders and investors in North Korea would be continually exposed to the vagaries of Pyongyang's decision making, which, for whatever reason, has consistently elevated diplomatic over economic goals, as illustrated by the recent interference in the operation of the Kaesong Industrial Complex.
ASSESSING IMPACT
It is less clear how much of an impact on commerce the sanctions actually had, however. exercise as a middle power with diplomatic relations with North Korea; its list also has the virtue of being specified in simple terms, facilitating concordance to SITC categories). The second variant ("Japanese list") is based on KOTRA (2006) , which attempted to map the Japanese sanctions list to detailed product categories using the Harmonized System (HS) (Kim 2006) . The third variant ("Australian list-HS") reconstructs the Australian list using KOTRA's HS codes, which tend to be more narrowly drawn than the SITC-based categories used to construct the Australian SITC list.
As can be seen in figure 1 Korea and China, and North and South Korea are shown in figures 2 and 3, respectively. The data exhibit significant month-to-month volatility and strong seasonal patterns-trade volumes drop off in the winter possibly due to slowdowns of economic activity or, particularly in the case of China, the impassibility of unpaved roads on the North Korean side of the border. It is not apparent from figures 2 and 3 that the imposition of sanctions had any impact on trade flows, particularly once the expected winter decline in activity is taken into account.
However, figures 2 and 3 also illustrate that North Korean trade was generally on an upward trend.
It is possible that statistical models could detect an impact of the imposition of sanctions and the more general increase in political risk that might not be apparent to the eye. Simple models incorporating only a time trend, seasonal dummies, and a dummy variable for the post-nuclear test/sanctions period are reported in tables 2 (China) and 3 (South Korea). 7 Two variants are reported: the first based on the original monthly trade data, and a second in which the data have been cumulated on a quarterly basis for use in subsequent models where other variables are available only on a quarterly basis. There are positive time trends in all of the regressions and some evidence of seasonality as well. In the monthly data there appear to be some declines in activity in the winter months. 7. The equivalent exercise cannot be conducted on the luxury goods data because in contrast to the aggregate data reported in figures 2 and 3, the disaggregated product-specific data are only available for annual observations. 8. Not surprisingly, given the simplicity of these models, in some of the regressions there is evidence of autocorrelated residuals, which means that the estimated standard errors are likely to be biased downward, and as a consequence the In most cases these models detect no significant change in trade flows following the nuclear test and the imposition of UN sanctions (i.e., the null hypothesis of a zero-valued coefficient on the test/sanctions dummy could not be rejected), and in regressions 2.1 (monthly Chinese exports to North Korea), 3.2 and 3.4 (South Korean imports from North Korea), the post-test period is actually associated with larger than expected trade volumes.
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A more complete characterization of trade behavior would take the level of economic activity explicitly into account; trade is not only a function of sanctions, but also of macroeconomic performance.
North Korea can be considered a "small country" in that its imports are so small relative to the exports of either of its principal partners (less than 0.25 percent of total exports in both cases) that it is a "price taker" facing a perfectly elastic supply of exports at a parametrically given price ( Korean supply curve (i.e., the magnitude of their demands are such that external demand shifts actually affect North Korean internal prices). In modeling terms this possibility implies the need to estimate demand and supply simultaneously. Given this increase in analytical complexity, the fact that the UN sanctions were mainly on exports to North Korea, not imports from North Korea, and that there are no qualitative differences in the estimated results for export and import trade, for the sake of brevity, consideration of North Korean exports to China and South Korea has been set aside to focus on trade moving in the other direction.
reported level of statistical significance is exaggerated. For obvious reasons this is a bigger issue for the regressions on monthly data.
9. In the case of the two regressions on monthly data (2.1 and 3.2) this is subject to the caveat regarding autocorrelated residuals and exaggerated statistical significance noted in footnote 8. Tables 4 and 5 report regressions incorporating only the North Korean economic activity term, derived by quarterly interpolations of Bank of Korea annual GDP growth estimates. The inclusion of the activity renders the time trend insignificant and reduces the autocorrelation of the residuals to an acceptable level. The estimated income elasticities are extremely large (i.e., in terms of figure 4, the shift Q 0 gQ 1 ). One possibility is that the impact of omitted variables is being misattributed to the activity term.
There are three obvious possibilities for the fact that changes in North Korean income appear to have a very large impact on the demand for imports. The first is that behavior of North Korean households and importing firms has been changing during the sample period; specifically, exposure to new products from China and South Korea has in effect boosted the demand for imports. Something quite similar to this was observed in Eastern Europe, particularly East Germany in the days following unification, when the suddenly enhanced availability of new Western products led to a massive shift in consumer preferences away from home goods (Dornbusch and Wolf 1994) . As a consequence, an upsurge in demand may have swamped any impact of sanctions.
A second, related possibility, which also echoes the German experience, is that the development of new institutional channels of trade has greatly reduced transaction costs, and this secular decline in transaction costs, possibly together with a shift in consumer preferences, has led to an upsurge in the demand for imports, which in these regressions is being captured in the activity term. Again, such effects may have overridden the impact of sanctions.
The third possibility is that as a high-inflation economy with a fixed nominal exchange rate, North
Korea is by definition experiencing real exchange rate appreciation. For North Korea, the relative price of imports is a function of foreign prices converted to North Korean won via an exchange rate, P*E/P. With the nominal rate, E, unchanged, the movement in the real exchange rate, P*E/P, would be a function of differential change in the foreign and local price levels, P* and P, respectively. This real appreciation may have driven a growth in the demand for imports and has not been captured in the preceding specifications. The situation is complicated further by the existence of both an official nominal exchange rate and a parallel or black-market rate.
The problem is that we cannot observe P, North Korean prices, directly. Hence one solution would be to use movements in the black-market exchange rate as a proxy for changes in the unobservable domestic price level, P. This is not perfect: In a high-inflation environment, demand for foreign exchange as a relatively liquid "safe haven" investment may outstrip both domestic prices and the prices of imported goods, and as a consequence, movement in the black-market value of the won (which in fact depreciated continuously over the sample period) may be an upwardly biased measure of inflation. In table 6, the log inverse black-market exchange rate is added to the specifications reported in tables 4 and 5 (i.e., an increase in the value is an appreciation and would be expected to be associated with a larger volume of imports). As can be seen in table 6, this variable is not statistically significant.
In terms of figure 4, this indicates that the changes in trade volumes are driven by the income shift Q 0 gQ 1 while price effects, Q 0 gQ 2 , are imperceptible. It could be that the black-market exchange rate is not a good proxy for the unobservable domestic price level. Another possibility is that trade is occurring contemporaneously at both the official exchange rate as well as the black-market rate. In such circumstances, real exchange rates calculated using either official or black-market rates will be a noisy proxy for the actual rate imbedded in the trade.
The models reported in tables 4, 5, and 6 assume that all adjustment to variations in activity and prices occurs within a single quarter; a large literature examines the issue of noncontemporaneous adjustment of trade to changes in the levels of economic activity and relative prices (Goldstein and Khan 1985) . There are two basic approaches to estimating these relationships. The first is to estimate distributed lags of each explanatory variable directly. The second is to include a lagged dependent variable on the right hand side, imposing the same long-run geometric adjustment pattern on all of the independent variables.
The conventional wisdom is that variations in activity levels feed through to trade flows relatively quickly, while the impact of relative price changes takes longer to manifest. In the case at hand, the exchange rate term was never statistically significant either contemporaneously (table 6) or noncontemporaneously (not reported for the sake of parsimony). There is some evidence of lagged adjustment with respect to the income term, but permitting noncontemporaneous adjustment has no significant effect on the nuclear test/sanctions coefficient.
TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS EXTENSIONS
As shown in figures 2 and 3, North Korea's trade volumes have shown an upward trend. It is possible that these trends in the key trade and income series are so pronounced that the series are said to be nonstationary, and hence simple ordinary least squares estimates such as those reported in tables 2 through 6 are biased and inconsistent (Hamilton 1994) . It is possible to test for and take into account the nature of nonstationarity; in particular that two series are cointegrated processes, and thus generate unbiased and consistent estimates. However, the relatively short time series makes implementation of modern time-series techniques problematic.
The first step is to test for the presence of so-called unit roots in the series. The Dickey-Fuller test assumes that such roots are present; the null hypotheses can be rejected at high levels of statistical confidence in the income series, but there is weak evidence of trend in the trade series. As a first pass, the quarterly series were differenced by four lags (to generate stationary series and take care of possible seasonality) and the regressions estimated. As shown in table 7, there is no evidence that trade trends changed after the nuclear test and the imposition of sanctions, though there is evidence of increasing sensitivity of imports from China to the level of economic activity in North Korea.
Given that the evidence of unit roots both in the income and trade series is weak, it is unlikely that a cointegrating relationship is present. And indeed, in the Johansen test for cointegration, the null hypothesis of no cointegration cannot be rejected in the China regressions; however, in the South Korean regressions, the null can be rejected: There is evidence of cointegration. Given the small sample size and the possibly problematic nature of the data, this confounding result (a cointegrating relationship despite the absence of a unit root for one of the series) is presumably spurious.
CONCLUSIONS
Beginning with visual inspection and ending with the most sophisticated time-series models that can be implemented given the weakness of the data, no evidence has been found that economic sanctions by the It is also possible that the test and the subsequent ratcheting up of political tensions increased the risk premium on trade with North Korea but that the models are just too crude to capture them:
The sample period under the sanctions regime is relatively short, and hence the power of the statistical tests comparing behavior before and after the test may be low. But the apparent steady growth in trade throughout the period in question does not suggest a major shift in behavior, regardless of the power of the statistical tests. More plausibly, it may also be the case that in light of the change of government in Seoul, South Korean behavior may change. Whether the current Lee Myung-bak government would react in a fashion similar to its predecessor is questionable. In some sense these considerations are subject to self-correction: As time goes by, more sanctions-period observations will become available, and eventually the sanctions may well be removed, generating additional sample variation for modeling.
Nor should these results be interpreted as suggesting that all economic sanctions are useless. In contrast to the UN trade sanctions, evidence suggests that the disruptions to financial flows associated with the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) case had economic and possibly political impact. Accounts at BDA were associated with missile proliferation (Pinkston 2008) , unrecorded gold sales (Haggard and Noland 2007 , appendix A), and allegedly Kim Jong-il's political slush fund (Chestnut 2007) . 11 Apart from disrupting these activities, the financial shock led to a fall in the black-market value of the won, put a squeeze on legitimate commerce (Cowie 2006) , and reportedly necessitated a scaling back of festivities associated with Kim Jong-il's birthday. More importantly, the accounts of the Six Party Talks reveal a strong North Korean interest in resolving the BDA issue and a willingness to make concessions to do so.
Nevertheless, the central message that emerges from this analysis is that the pre-test conventional wisdom that a North Korean nuclear test would resonate dramatically appears to have been misguided.
Despite pre-test diplomatic warnings not to test, the post-test behavior of public-and private-sector actors in China and South Korea has been accepting of North Korea's nuclear status. The test and even the imposition of limited sanctions do not appear to have had a perceptible effect on the country's trade relationships with its two principal partners. If such warnings are to be heeded in the future, they must embody credible threats of penalty. In the present case, of course, a major problem appears to be that some of the permanent members of the Security Council, particularly China, displayed reluctance to fully embrace and implement sanctions.
North Korea may have calculated quite correctly that the direct penalties for establishing itself as a nuclear power would be modest indeed. Presumably this experience will condition North Korean policymakers' reactions in the future, making deterrence on this issue and other sources of conflict more difficult. Sanctions, fecklessly applied, may be worse than useless: They could actually encourage other states to pursue undesirable behavior. If trade sanctions are to deter behavior in the future, they will have to be much more broadly targeted and enthusiastically implemented.
One can question whether this was ever in the cards in the North Korean case. Clearly the United Nations had ratcheted up its response with each succeeding provocation, and Resolution 1695 established that China (and Russia) would no longer protect North Korea from sanctions in the Security Council.
Yet it was also clear that they were less than enthusiastic in supporting the policy and would act as a brake on the United States and others. The real question then is less why sanctions were ineffective, but why US policymakers chose to go down a path that appears to have had little likelihood of reaching the desired outcome? 
APPENDIX: DOCUMENTATION

Data and Data Sources
Nuclear Sanctions: UN (2006).
Data Preparation
Trade data: Trade with North Korea is recorded from North Korea's trading partners' perspective, in this case either China or South Korea. Trade data were originally recorded in monthly increments and were summed over quarters to get the quarterly numbers. Following conventional practice, the natural log of these quarterly totals is used as the dependent variable in the trade equations.
Income data: South Korea's quarterly real GDP data were calculated using nominal, quarterly, localcurrency GDP and deflating it by South Korea's quarterly GDP deflator. A quarterly GDP deflator was unavailable for China, so real year-on-year quarterly GDP growth numbers from CEIC were applied to nominal quarterly GDP numbers to calculate real GDP for each quarter after the first year of the sample (2000) . Chinese inflation in that year was negligible and does not distort subsequent observations. Both the nominal and real Chinese production data display strong seasonality. Annual observations on North Korea's real GDP were interpolated to generate quarterly data. Again, following normal procedures, once quarterly real GDP has been calculated, an index is formed in which the first observation is set equal to 100, and the natural log is used in the trade equations.
Exchange rate data: Exchange rate data come from various sources and are originally priced in either US dollars (US$) or renminbi (RMB). We have found in the past that implied US$-RMB exchange rates, in terms of relative won prices, tend to be very close to actual dollar-RMB rates and are therefore willing to use the NK won-US$ exchange rate data to determine both RMB (where NK won-RMB data are not available) and NK won-SK won exchange rates. NK won is always in the numerator for our samples, and the exchange rate is indexed to 100 for the first observation of each sample. For use as an explanatory variable, in the absence of a relative price term, we take the natural log of this index used in the trade equation. Durbin's alternative test for autocorrelation, Prob > chi 0.
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation, Prob > chi 0.
* p<0.0, ** p<0.0, *** p<0.00
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Differenced log North Korean GNI index 0.** 0.
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